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NOTES
WATERS: SURFACE WATER DRAINAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The disposition and control of surface water between precipitation and
collection within defined watercourses or lakes is not only a question of
considerable legal complexity but also one of great importance to Florida.
Florida's surface contains a relatively large proportion of water area,'
originating mainly from draining surface and percolating rainwater, and to
a lesser degree from springs. The water area of the lower half of peninsular
Florida, including Lake Okeechobee, the Everglades, and all of the Kissim-
mee River basin, is supplied entirely by rainwater.2 The rainfall is not
only heavy but largely seasonal; therefore the natural and artificial drain-
age systems are overburdened during the rainy season, making questions of
real property invasion and tort liability even more imminent in Florida
than in states having less marked seasonal variations. The problem in the
southern part of the state is somewhat unique because of the extreme
flatness of the surface. Many states are concerned only with waters flow-
ing in distinguishable channels, or at least in definable directions; but in
some parts of South Florida the waters flow in various directions, depend-
ing upon the prevailing winds and the location of the rainfall as well as
the slight natural depressions. These waters have in a sense been dealt
with by statute under general and special drainage laws; but many large
areas are not included within drainage districts, and the courts have not
been called upon to deal directly with the rights and responsibilities of
landowners in regard to these waters.
Surface water is a term commonly used by the layman to refer to all
lake and river waters above the ground as distinguished from ground
waters beneath the surface. This differs, however, from the legal defini-
tion, which states that surface water is derived from falling rain, melting
snow, and springs that diffuse themselves over the ground, following no
defined course or channel. 3 Courts have generally classified as surface
'The slightly larger state of Georgia has only one sixteenth the water area of
Florida. Eight per cent of Florida's surface area is covered with water. 11 ENcYc.
AmMCANA 367 (1948).
'Dr. A. P. Black, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Florida and Presi-
dent of the American Water Works Association.
'For a definition of surface water and a general classification of all waters see
[ 392 ]
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water non-flowing marsh and swamp water, 4 embankment seepage, 5 flood
water that has left its permanent channel, 6 street drain water,7 and
water on roof tops.8 The classifications among lake, watercourse, surface,
percolating, and subterranean waters overlap in a shaded area where the
division can be said to be only one of degree.
The utilization of non-surface waters by owners depends upon the ap-
plication of the reasonable-use doctrine. This rule of law is more difficult
to apply than to define, but it depends substantially upon two factors:
the uses to which the adjoining property is put and the duty of proprietors
to cooperate with one another. 9 In contrast to the law governing the use
of non-surface waters, the law of surface waters is controlled by the
variations of two classical rules of law in addition to the doctrine of rea-
sonable use.
II. THE CIVI-LAW RuLE
Under the classical civil-law rule no person has a right to interfere with
the natural flow of surface water to the extent that the enjoyment of an-
other's land is disturbed. Therefore the owner of lower land must allow
drainage waters from higher land to flow uninterrupted over the servient
estate as long as the water flows in its natural course and manner. On the
other hand, the owner of the dominant estate is under an obligation not to
increase this duty or make it more burdensome. 0 Since owners hold land
under titles and boundaries that do not purport to allocate drainage respon-
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 593-94, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896).
Warnack v. Brownlee, 84 Ga. 196, 10 S. E. 738 (1890); Enderson v. Kelehan,
226 Minn. 163, 32 N. W.2d 286 (1948); Skinner v. Silver, 158 Ore. 81, 75 P.2d 21
(1938); Case v. Hoffman, 84 Wis. 438, 54 N. W. 793 (1893).
'Gray v. McWilliams, 98 Cal. 157, 32 Pac. 976 (1893); Curtis v. Eastern R. R., 98
Mass. 428 (1868).
O0'Connell v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 87 Ga. 246, 13 S. E. 489 (1891);
Mohatt v. Olson, 146 Neb. 764, 21 N. W.2d 516 (1946).
'Urse v. Maryland Casualty Co., 58 F. Supp. 897 (N. D. W. Va. 1945); LeBrun v.
Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825 (1930); Sisters of St. Joseph Corp. v. Atlas Sand,
Gravel and Stone Co., 120 Conn. 168, 180 Atl. 303 (1935); Poole v. Sun Underwriters
Ins. Co., 65 S. D. 422, 274 N. W. 658 (1937).
gBringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 Atl. 795 (1924); McCullough v.
Hartpence, 141 N. J. Eq. 499, 58 A.2d 233 (1948).
'Mason v. Hoyle, 56 Conn. 255, 14 Atl. 786 (1888); Cason v. Florida Power Co.,
74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Meyers v. Lafayette Club, 197 Minn. 241, 266 N. W.
861 (1936); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S. W.2d 889
(1935); Home v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815 (1921).
1 Brumley v. Dower, 78 Fla. 495, 83 So. 912 (1919).
2
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sibility, the civil-law rule recognized the equity of maintaining the ad-
vantages and inconveniences that nature has stamped on the land." The
rule was first applied in this country by the courts of Louisiana in Orleans
Navigation Co. v. New Orleans,12 decided in 1812. The second Ameri-
can jurisdiction to apply the rule clearly was Pennsylvania in Martin v.
Riddle, 13 decided in 1848. The latter case overlooked the several prior
Louisiana decisions and derived the rule directly from the codes of Eu-
ropean nations.' 4 Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia pay
lip service to the rule, but none apply it without qualifications and
changes. 15
1 1Gormley v. Sandford, 52 Ill. 158, 162 (1869).
132 Martin 214 (La. 1812).
1326 Pa. 415, not reported until 1856.
"'Id. at 416: "Not readily finding the subject treated of in any of our usual books
of reference, I venture to extract the law from the books of a foreign origin-
Corp. Jur. Div. 39, 3, 1, and 43, 21; Code Nap. sec. 640; Poth. du Voisinage."
"Tennessee A. & G. Ry. v. Cardon, 27 Ala. 585, 177 So. 171 (1937) ; Shahan v.
Brown, 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913); Turner v. Hopper, 83 Cal. App.2d 215, 188
P.2d 257 (1948); Archer v. Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App.2d 68, 119 P.2d 1 (1941);
Debevtz v. New Brantner Ext. Ditch Co., 78 Colo. 396, 241 Pac. 1111 (1925) ; City of
Boulder v. Boulder & W. R. Ditch & Res. Co., 73 Colo. 426, 216 Pac. 553 (1923);
Shorman v. Queen Anne's R. R., 3 Penne. 407, 54 Atl. 687 (1901); Floyd County 'V.
Fincher, 169 Ga. 460, 150 S. E. 577 (1929); Farkas v. Towns, 103 Ga. 150, 29 S. E.
700 (1897) ; Loosli v. Hesernan, 66 Idaho 469, 162 P.2d 393 (1945); Logsdon v. An-
derson, 30 N. W.2d 787 (Iowa 1948); Nixon v. Welch, 238 Iowa 34, 24 N. W.2d 476
(1946) ; Schmahl v. Ackerson, 332 Ill. App. 278, 74 N. E.2d 614 (1947) ; Bruce v.
Blanchard, 338 Ill. 211, 170 N. E. 260 (1930) ; Bolinger v. Moorhouse, 154 Kan. 124,
114 P.2d 853 (1941); Dyer v. Stahlhut, 147 Kan. 767, 78 P.2d 900 (1938); Gott v.
Franklin, 307 Ky. 466, 211 S. W.2d 680 (1948); Board v. Schneider, 301 Ky. 289,
191 S. W.2d 418 (1945); Brown v. Blankenship, 28 So.2d 496 (La. 1946); Caldwell
v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932); Miskotten v. Drenten, 318 Mich. 538, 29
N. W.2d 91 (1947); Ruehs v. Schantz, 309 Mich. 245, 15 N. W.2d 148 (1944);
Johnston v. Rosaschi, 44 Nev. 386, 194 Pac. 1063 (1921); Boynton v. Longley, 19
Nev. 69, 6 Pac. 437 (1885); Davis v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 227 N. C. 561, 42 S. E.2d
905 (1947); Holton v. Northwestern Oil Co., 201 N. C. 744, 161 S. E. 391 (1931);
Larson v. Remeikis, 76 N. E.2d 922 (Ohio 1946); Henicle v. Pennsylvania R. R., 49
Ohio App. 477, 197 N. E. 360 (1934) ; Beals v. Robertson, 356 Pa. 348, 52 A.2d 316
(1947); Lehigh & W. B. Coal Mining Co. v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 289 Pa. 492,
137 Atl. 672 (1927); Greene v. Gertz, 36 R. I. 105, 89 At. 16 (1913); Johnson v.
White, 26 R. I. 207, 58 At]. 658 (1904); Faris v. Moore, 26 N. W.2d 130 (S. D. 1947);
Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 N. W.2d 737 (S. D. 1946); Dixon v. Nash-
ville, 213 S. W.2d 178 (Tenn. 1946); Wilson v. Louisville & N. R. R., 12 Tenn. App.
327 (1930) ; Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W.2d 404 (1932) (Civil-law rule
applies to Mexican grant land-by statute, VERNON'S ANN. Crv. STAT. art. 759a, com-
mon-enemy doctrine applies to all other lands); Nolte Irr. Co. v. Willis, 180 S. W.2d
3
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III. THE COMMoN-ENEMY OR
COMmON-LAW RULE
The second classical rule is the common-enemy rule. Under this doc-
trine, water that falls on land is a common enemy, with which any pro-
prietor has an unlimited and unrestricted legal right to deal as he pleases,
nothwithstanding harm resulting to neighboring landowners.'
6  Thus an
owner may refuse to receive surface water and may divert it at will. One
court has justified the rule on the ground of complete land ownership
and enjoyment,17 and at least two others upon the mistaken belief that it
represents the rule at the English common law;1s but most adopt the rule
as one that encourages land improvement and cultivation.
19
Since this rule is sometimes improperly called the common-law rule and
Florida is a "common-law" state, it is of interest to review the historical
background of this doctrine. Most writers have now agreed that the term
"common-law rule" is a misnomer and that the real English rule is more
similar to the civil-law doctrine.20 Since in England such controversies
are handled by administrative agencies of the government, 2 1 English re-
ports deal far less frequently with the problem than would be expected. As
early as 1427, statutes established administrative procedures with respect
to land drainage and protection against sea and flood. 2 2 Before the
King's Bench in 1344, however, a plaintiff complained that "the defendant
451 (Teax. 1944); Rich v. Stephens, 79 Utah 411, 11 P.2d 295 (1932) (lower building
owner owed duty to carry off upper owner's water on ground of estoppel) ; Perkins v.
Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp., 106 Vt. 367, 177 AUt. 631 (1934) (damage liability
for negligent handling); White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co.,
105 Vt. 24, 162 AUt. 859 (1932); Fire Dist. No. 1 v. Graniteville Spring Water Co., 103
Vt. 89, 152 Atl. 42 (1930). Vermont makes no such classification as surface water except
in the lay sense of being ground water. Surface water is included within the class of
percolating water, which is governed by the English rule of absolute ownership, as in
Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324 (1843).
lBrumley v. Dorner, 78 Fla. 495, 83 So. 912 (1919).
"'Grant v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156 (1874).
i'Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 83 Mo. 271, 53 Am. Rep. 581 (1884);
Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. R., 39 S. C. 472, 18 S. E. 58 (1893).
"Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351, 86 Am. Dec. 216 (1865); Barkley v. Wilcox,
86 N. Y. 140, 40 Am. Rep. 519 (1887).
"Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583, 20 N. W. 595 (1884); Miller v. Letzerich, 121
Teax. 248, 49 S. W.2d 404 (1932).
"See Note, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 899 (1940).
226 HEN. VI, c. 5 (1427); 8 HEN. VI, c. 3 (1429); 18 HaN. VI, c. 10 (1439); 23
HEN. VI, c. 8 (1444) ; 12 EDW. IV, c. 6 (1472) ; 4 HEN. VII, c. 1 (1487) ; 23 HEN. VIII,
c. 4 (1531); 25 HEN. VII, c. 10 (1533).
4
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had erected a house adjoining his house and higher, so that the water and
drops of rain could not flow down as they were wont to do, but fell upon
the walls of his house, by reason whereof the timber of his house rotted."' 23
This was held an actionable wrong.
In 1851 the court said, in respect to yearly floods, that each man could
ditch his land to the adjoining lower land and so on down the line until
the water came to a river or ditch. 24 This is even broader than the civil-
law rule, since it allows accumulation and dumping. In the British Em-
pire, although New Zealand 2 5" and some Canadian states26 apply the
common-enemy doctrine, the civil-law rule has been generally adopted. 2 7
The name "common enemy" was first used in connection with surface
waters in Town of Union v. Durkes2 8 in 1875, when attention was drawn
to the coinage of the term by Lord Tenterden in the case of King v.
Commissioners of Sewers for Pagham, which dealt, however, with sea and
not surface waters. 2 9 Therefore there was confusion as to the naming as
well as the origin of the rule. In clear form the doctrine appears in the
leading Massachusetts case of Gannon v. Hargadon.3 o At present twenty-
two states and the District of Columbia give some notice to the doctrine.31
"3 Y. B. Pike 18 Edw. III, p. 210 (1344).
"Harcourt v. Spicer, Y. B. 12 Hen. VIII, p. 2 (1521).
"6Black & White Cabs, Ltd. v. Tonks, 47 N. Z. L. R. 590 (1928).
"eIn 1934 the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Rural Municipality of Scott
v. Edwards, S. C. Rep. 332, adopted the common-enemy rule for all Canadian prov-
inces except possibly Quebec, which follows more closely the French civil law.
2 See Note, 24 MiN. L. REv. 891, 901 (1940).
2838 N. J. L. 21 (1875).
2-8 B. & C. 355, 108 Eng. Rep. 1075 (1828). Sea water has been held in Florida
to be a common enemy. Paty v. Palm Beach, 158 Fla. 575, 29 So.2d 363 (1947).
"O10 Allen 106 (Mass. 1865).
"1Walker v. Southern Pac. R. R., 165 U. S. 593 (1897); Pearce v. Scott, 29 F.2d 630
(App. D. C. 1928); Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 61 Ariz. 412, 150 P.2d 81 (1944);
Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley L. & I. Co., 36 Ariz. 65, 282 Pac. 937 (1929) ; Brasko
v. Prislovsky, 207 Ark. 1034, 183 S. W.2d 925 (1944); Leader v. Matthews, 192 Ark.
1049, 95 S. W.2d 1138 (1936); Tidewater 0. S. Corp. v. Shimelman, 114 Conn. 182,
158 Atl. 229 (1932); Grant v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156 (1874); Baltimore & 0. R. R. v.
Thomas, 37 App. D. C. 255 (1911); State v. Chaus, 223 Ind. 629, 63 N. E.2d 199
(1945); Ramsey v. Ketcham, 73 Ind. App. 200, 127 N. E. 204 (1920); Murphy v.
Kelly, 68 Me. 521 (1878); Morrison v. Bucksport & B. R. R., 67 Me. 353 (1877);
Maddock v. Springfield, 281 Mass. 103, 183 N. E. 14-8 (1932); Belcastro v. Norris,
261 Mass. 174, 158 N. E. 535 (1927); Miller v. Ervin, 192 Miss. 712, 6 So.2d 910
(1942); Columbus & G. Ry. v. Taylor, 149 Miss. 269, 115 So. 200 (1928); Casanover
v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S. W.2d 556 (Mo. 1948); White v. Wabash R. R., 207
S. W.2d 505 (Mo. 1947); LeMunyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., 60 Mont. 517, 199 Pac.
915 (1921) (generally no sin of mishandling too much but keeping too much) ; Jor-
5
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IV. MODIICAIONS EXCEPTIONS
It is important to recognize that, although most jurisdictions may claim
to follow either the common-enemy or the civil-law rule, neither of these
rules is followed in any jurisdiction without some modification. The most
important modification is the curtailment of the common-enemy rule as
regards the unlimited right to discharge water onto neighboring land
regardless of the resulting damage.3 2 The limitations of different com-
mon-enemy states take various forms. For example, in Cdsanover v. Villa-
nova Realty Co. 33 the Missouri Court allowed the damming of water
back onto higher land but not an unnecessary collection and casting onto
lower property. The Arkansas qualification on unlimited rights to turn
back or dump surface water is a test of whether such an act was done in
good faith.3 4 However phrased, these courts point to the application of a
reasonable-use doctrine.
The logical conclusion of the civil law is that an upper proprietor can-
not change the amoant of direction of water flowing onto lower land; yet
it is widely held under this rulc that in the interest of good husbandry
there is a limited right to collect and discharge larger amounts of water
genson v. Stephens, 143 Neb. 528, 10 N. W.2d 337 (1943); Aldritt 'v. Fleischauer, 74
Neb. 66, 103 N. W. 1084 (1905) ; McCullough v. Hartpence, 141 N. J. Eq. 499, 58 A.2d
233 (1948); Zamelli v. Trost, 132 N. J. L. 388, 40 A.2d 783 (1945); Rix v. Alamo-
gordo, 42 N. M. 325, 77 P.2d 765 (1938); Giovitto v. Nassau County, 63 N. Y. S.2d
864 (1946) ; Foster v. Webster, 44 N. Y. S.2d 153 (1943) ; Henderson v. Hines, 48 N.
D. 130, 183 N. IV. 529 (1921); Hatmaker v. Gripe, 184 Okla. 26, 84 P.2d 418 (1937);
Taylor v. Shriver, 82 Okla. 11, 198 Pac. 329 (1921); see Morton v. Oregon Short
Line Ry., 48 Ore. 444, 87 Pac. 161 (1906), citing improperly Price v. Oregon R. R., 47
Ore. 350, 83 Pac. 843 (1906); Milhous v. State Highway Dept., 194 S. C. 33, 8 S. E.2d
852 (1940); Fairey v. Southern Ry., 162 S. C. 129, 160 S. E. 274 (1931); Third
Buckingham Community v. Anderson, 178 Va. 478, 17 S. E.2d 433 (1941); Ra.eigh
Court Corp. v. Faucett, 140 Va. 126, 124 S. E. 433 (1924) ; De Ruwe v. Morrison, 28
Wash.2d 797, 184 P.2d 273 (1947); Morton v. Hines, 112 Wash. 612, 192 Pac. 1016
(1920); Lindamood v. Board of Education, 92 W. Va. 387, 114 S. E. 800 (1922);
Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266 (1896); Chicago B. & Q.
R. R. v. Railroad Commission, 199 Wis. 342, 226 N. W. 286 (1929); Vick v.
Strehmel, 197 Wis. 366, 222 N. W. 307 (1928); Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102
P.2d 54 (1940); State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005 (1935).
"Note, 24 MN. L. Rav. 891, 917-919 (1940), lists cases from 19 common-enemy
states so holding.
2209 S. W.2d 556 (Mo. 1948).
"Brasko v. Prislovsky, 207 Ark. 1034, 183 S. W.2d 925 (1944).
"Note, 24 inN. L. Rav. 891, 920-922 (1940), lists cases from fourteen civil-law
6
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than would naturally flow.3 5 Thus in the recent case of Beals v. Robert-
son 3 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, while upper owners
cannot make new channels or concentrate and increase the flow of water
artificially, they may increase the flow through the natural and reasonable
use of their land.
The common-enemy doctrine has been accepted by many so-called
civil-law states as applicable to urban areas.3 7 It encourages the con-
struction of houses and buildings because it removes water damage liability
from those landowners changing the land surface. In Alabama Power Co.
v. Alford 3s the Court stated that the weight of civil-law authority recog-
nizes such an exception. For the same reason, earlier decisions have held
railroads not liable for obstruction to surface waters.3 9 Such exceptions in
civil-law states and the general policy in common-enemy states have been
tempered by a rule of reasonableness requiring railways to avoid unneces-
sary and negligent damage. 40 Although there is a general disallowance
of banking ordinary flood waters onto a neighbor's land,41 some civil-
law states have also made an exception for flood waters, realizing that it




Recognizing the faults and advantages of both classical approaches
and realizing the practical effect of confusion by accepting a large number
states as so holding.
3356 Pa. 348, 52 A.2d 316, 317 (1947).
"'Ex parte Tennessee Coal, Iron and R. R. Co., 206 Ala. 403, 90 So. 876 (1921);
Los Angeles Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461, 37 Pac. 375 (1894) ; Freeburg
v. Davenport, 63 Iowa 119, 18 N. W. 705 (1884); Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583,
20 N. W. 595 (1884); Rielly v. Stephenson, 222 Pa. St. 252, 70 Ad. 1097 (1908).
Contra: Goldsmith v. Elsas, 53 Ga. 187 (1874); Johnson v. Marcum, 152 Ky. 629,
153 S. W. 959 (1913); Garland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S. W. 940 (1899).
38210 Ala. 98, 97 So. 224 (1923).
9 Jordan v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 42 Minn. 172, 43 N. W. 849 (1889); Morrison
v. Bucksport & B. R. R., 67 Mo. 353 (1877); Priest v. Boston & M. R. R., 71 N. H.
114, 51 At. 667 (1901).
"0 St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Stevens, 124 Ark. 599, 186 S. W. 60 (1916); Columbus
& G. Ry. v. Taylor, 149 Miss. 269, 115 So. 200 (1928); Laugness v. Chicago M. &
St. P. Ry., 40 S. D. 546, 168 N. W. 1050 (1918) ; Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, 91 Va.
587, 22 S. E. 517 (1895).
"Keck v. Venghause, 127 Iowa 529, 103 N. W. 773 (1905); Crawford v. Rambo,
44 Ohio St. 279, 7 N. E. 429 (1886).
"2Mogle v. Moore, 100 Cal. 141, 104 P.2d 785 (1940); Mailbrot v. Pugh, 30 La.
Ann. 1359 (1878); Blain v. Brady, 64 Md. 373, 1 AtI. 609 (1885).
7
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of qualifications and variations, three states have pronounced dearly their
acceptance of the reasonable-use doctrine. Under that rule, liability is in-
curred only when interference with the flow of surface water is unreason-
able. Unlike the other two rules, no specific privileges or obligations are
laid down, the only test being a jury's decision of reasonableness as based
on all the circumstances involved in determining the optimum enjoyment
of all landowners. This doctrine is often called the New Hampshire rule,
since the leading case applying the rule is Franklin v. Durgee,4 3 decided
in that state. New Hampshire has unfalteringly followed the rule from
Swett v. Cutts,4 4 decided in 1870, to the present time.4 5
Minnesota can also be said to have adopted the reasonable-use doctrine
in full. 4 6 The early Minnesota cases followed the common-enemy rule.
4 7
This rule, however, was generalized and modified until a reasonable-use
doctrine was applied in Sheehan v. Flynn,4 8 proposing that each decision
should be based on the consideration of all the circumstances in each
case. In 1934 the state accepted the reasonable-use doctrine in its fullest
extent 4 9 and has applied it consistently ever since.50 Following the lead
of these two states, the former civil-law state of Maryland 5 ' in Whitman v.
Forney,5 2 decided in 1943, accepted the doctrine unqualifiedly. In Biber-
man v. Funkkouser,53 however, the same court outlined the state's civil-
law background but proceeded to add qualifications rendering the practical
result, including damages, the same as in Whitman v. Forney.
Several other states have made running shots at the same results. The
Illinois Supreme Court in 1869, in the case of Gormley v. Sandford,5 4
clearly proposed that a reasonable-use doctrine be applied to surface wa-
ters, as did Massachusetts in 1899. 5 5 Although Virginia states that it
follows the common-enemy rule, this view is qualified by the maxim that
a proprietor must use his own property so as not to injure his neighbor's
"371 N. H. 186, 51 At. 911 (1901).
"so N. H. 439 (1870).
'5 Sakansky v. Wein, 86 N. H. 337, 169 At!. 1 (1933).
"Note, 24 MINw. L. R1v. 891, 908 (1940).
1
TRowe v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 41 Minn. 384, 43 N. W. 76 (1889).
"859 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462 (1894).
"Bush v. City of Rochester, 191 Minn. 591, 255 N. W. 256 (1934).
"OEnderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N. W.2d 286 (1948).
';Eisenstein v. Annapolis, 177 Md. 222, 9 A.2d 224 (1939); Philadelphia, W. & B.
R. R. v. Davis, 68 Md. 281, 11 At!. 822 (1888).
32181 Md. 652, 31 A.2d 630 (1943).
"358 A.2d 668 (Md. 1948).
"'52 I11. 158 (1869).
"rMiddlesex Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103, 21 N. E. 230 (1899).
8
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property unnecessarily or negligently. 5 6 Throughout the entire group of
western states, drainage and irrigation ditches handling surface waters must
be dug and used without negligence or want of ordinary care based on an
analysis of all surrounding circumstances. 5 7 Several common-enemy juris-
dictions reach a reasonable-use result by holding that the control of sur-
face waters should not create a nusance.58s Many courts recognize the
correlative rights of adjoining landowners as to surface water and are
slowly and tortuously catching step with the reasonable-use doctrine as
applied to riparian owners.
The reasonable-use doctrine is in effect little more than a concept
allowing the fact-determining body to reach an unhampered conclusion.
It is a rule that is of no benefit when used alone. To be more specific,
several situations demand and result in definite answers:
1. If surface water damage is proximately due to an act of God,
then no recovery by the injured party is allowed.
5 9
2. If damage is due to an act of God and human intervention, the
intervenor is liable for his share of the damage.
60
3. An actor is not liable if the damage is not substantial (de mini-
mus non curat lex). 6 1
4. An actor is not liable, even though damage is substantial, when
it is prudently caused in the furtherance of a socially desirable
interest or the improvement of land.
6 2
VI. FLORIDA LAW
Surface water has been defined in Florida as water, regardless of
origin, that drains without any distinct or well-defined channel.
6 3 It is
5 6See 15 VA. L. REv. 288 (1929).
"7See 8 ORE. L. REv. 88 (1928).
"'Earl v. De Hart, 12 N. J. Eq. 280 (1856); Sweet v. Conley, 20 R. I. 381, 39 At.
326 (1898) ; Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. Reasonover, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 274, 81 S. W.
329 (1904).
59E.g., Oklahoma Ry. v. Boyd, 140 Okla. 45, 282 Pac. 157 (1929).
60E.g., Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 42 N. M. 325, 77 P.2d 765 (1938).
01E.g., Vick v. Strehmel, 197 Wis. 366, 222 N. W. 307 (1928).
"2King Land Co. v. Bowen, 7 Ala. App. 462, 61 So. 22 (1913); Edason v. Deni-
son, 142 Fla. 101, 194 So. 342 (1940); Bolinger v. Murray, 18 La. App. 158, 137 So.
761 (1931); Todd v. York County, 72 Neb. 207, 100 N. W. 299 (1904); Mason v.
Fulton, 80 Ohio St. 151, 88 N. E. 401 (1909); Beals v. Robertson, 356 Pa. 348, 52
A.2d 316 (1947); Johnson v. McMahon, 118 Tex. 633, 15 S. W.2d 1023 (1929);
McGehee v. Tidewater Ry., 108 Va. 508, 62 S. E. 356 (1908).
63Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896).
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generally held that a proprietor owns all the surface water that comes to
his land and has an absolute right to it.64 It appears that Florida would
follow the same rule. In the case of Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline"5
the Court by way of dictum held that an owner can appropriate for any
reasonable use subsurface water not flowing in a recognized channel.
Although he can use the water, no owner can legally collect and cast water
on the lower land in larger quantities than would normally pass. 6 6 No
proprietor can complain if such an ordinary flow injures his property. 67 If
this natural flow is not diverted, an upper owner is allowed to drain his
land into any natural stream or river so long as the watercourse is not
overtaxed. 68 On the other hand, a lower owner cannot neglect his duty
to keep the natural watercourse free of obstruction 6 9 and create a nuisance
by backing waters onto the land of his upper neighbor.
7 o
In Edason v. Denhson7 ' and Bray v. Winter Garden72 the Court held
that an upper owner should be permitted to ditch his land, thereby increas-
ing the normal burden on lower proprietors, when the result would be an
increased protection and improvement of the higher land. This decision
can be justified by the language in Brumley v. Dorner,73 in which the
Florida Supreme Court established an important milestone in surface-
water law. After recognizing and defining the two classical approaches,
the Court proclaimed that both rules have been greatly modified, and
stated that it is the almost unanimous conclusion that each case must stand
upon its own facts.7 4 Although the word "unanimous" is somewhat strong,
in this case the fact is recognized that the practical effect of all the devious
6'Poblman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 131 Iowa 89, 107 N. W. 1025 (1906);
MuhIelsen v. Krueger, 120 Neb. 380, 232 N. W. 735 (1930); Jordan v. City of Ben-
wood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266 (1896).
1137 Fla. 586, 600, 20 So. 780, 784 (1896).
"'Bray v. Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949); Panama City v. York, 157
Fla. 425, 26 So.2d 184 (1946); Dade County v. South Dade Farms, 133 Fla. 288, 182
So. 858 (1938); Brumley v. Dorner, 78 Fla. 495, 83 So. 912 (1919).
'WVillis v. Phillips, 147 Fla. 368, 2 So.2d 732 (1941).
"Bray v. Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949); Stoer v. Ocala Mfg. Ice &
Packing Co., 157 Fla. 4, 24 So.2d 579 (1946); Callan v. G. M. Cypher Co., 71 Fla.
14, 70 So. 841 (1916).
-Bray v. Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949); Stoer v. Ocala Mfg. Ice &
Packing Co., 157 Fla. 4, 24 So.2d 579 (1946).
TOSeaboard All Florida Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932).
I142 Fla. 101, 194 So. 342 (1940).
7240 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949).
- 78 Fla. 495, 83 So. 912 (1919).
"Id. at 501. 83 So. at 914.
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